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COLORISM AMONG SOUTH ASIANS: TITLE VII 
AND SKIN TONE DISCRIMINATION 
TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS

  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2013 Nina Davuluri, an Asian Indian from Syracuse, NY, became 
the first South Asian-American Miss America.1 Her selection prompted 
racist messages on Twitter “mixing up Indian, Indian-American, Arab, 
Muslim, and everything in between.”2 The racist tweets are not simply a 
commentary on racial “progress” in post-civil rights America but, more 
importantly from a legal perspective, illustrate the popularly held 
misunderstandings of South Asian identity. This confusion about South 
Asians is reflected in some employment discrimination cases. 
Asian Indians are often subsumed into a category called South Asians.3 
The term “South Asian” normally encompasses Dalits, Christians, 
Muslims, Sikhs, and other Indian minorities who represent a larger portion 
of the Indian population in the United States than they do in India.4 The 
 
 
  Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, Francis King Carey School of Law, 
University of Maryland. The author thanks Jason Hawkins and Susan McCarty for their research 
assistance with this project. 
 1. Lakshmi Chaudhry, Miss America Nina Davuluri: Too ‘Indian’ to ever be Miss India, FIRST 
POST (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.firstpost.com/living/miss-america-nina-davuluri-too-indian-to-ever-
be-miss-india-1111477.html. 
 2. Alex Williams, Beauty Pageants Draw Social Media Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/fashion/beauty-pageants-draw-social-media-critics.html?_r=0 
(quoting a blog post by Laura Beck). 
 3. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation consists of Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. SOUTH ASIAN ASS’N FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION, 
CHARTER (Dec. 8, 1985).  
 4. Prema Kurien, Who Speaks for Indian Americans? Religion Ethnicity, and Political 
Formation, 59 AM. Q. 759, 759 (2007). Hindu Indians do not always self-identify as South Asians 
reflecting political divisions within and outside the Asian Indian American community. To some 
“South Asian organizations represent pluralist subcontinental groups that are explicitly against the 
political Hindu movement.” Id. at 759. In contrast, “Hindu organizations represent political Hindu 
interests.” Id. “At the heart of the difference between Hindu and South Asian organizations lie two 
different conceptions of ‘Indianness’—a Hinducentric one that defines India as a Hindu country under 
attack from Muslims, Christians, and secularists within and without the country, and a secular, 
multireligious, multicultural conception that emphasizes the importance of developing harmonious 
relationships between groups and countries in the Indian subcontinent.” Id. at 763. Nevertheless, the 
division in the Indian American political groups pits pan-Hindu groups (either United States branches 
of Hindu nationalist groups existing in India or independent Hindu American organizations) against 
South Asian groups (usually consisting of coalitions of secular Hindus, leftist South Asian academics, 
Dalits, Indian Muslims, Indian Sikhs, and Indian Christians banding together on an anti-Hindutva 
platform). Id. Although divided, the Indian American community is seeing large gains in political 
influence due to their donations and India’s development as a key economic player. Id. at 759. 
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term “South Asian” is used throughout this article in the broadest sense, 
except where it is important to distinguish various subgroups.  
The largely congratulatory comments from South Asian commentators 
about Davuluri’s win were insightful in another troubling way. While 
reveling in the significance of her win, bloggers also commented on her 
skin tone, characterizing the new Miss America as dark brown.5 One 
Asian Indian American commentator sarcastically wrote, “That gorgeous 
chocolate may play as exotic in the West, but in India, we prefer our 
beauty queens strictly vanilla—preferably accessorised with blue contact 
lenses.”6 Thus it was not simply Davuluri’s win as Miss America that was 
deemed significant, it was her skin tone as well. A commentator added 
that Davuluri would have never won the Miss Indian America USA title 
because she is “too dark.”7 Still others added that in India someone with 
her skin tone would never be a contestant in a beauty contest, much less 
the winner.8  
These comments about Davuluri’s skin tone within the Asian Indian 
American community add to our understanding of how different non-white 
communities process skin tone. To me her skin tone seemed medium 
brown, but this difference in perspective is unsurprising. As I have written 
before, skin tone differences are relative.9 Further, when Davuluri’s skin 
tone is compared with the nine other non-white Miss Americas from 
1984–2014, with two exceptions, her skin tone looks much the same as the 
other winners.
10
  
 
 
 5. Chaudhry, supra note 1. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. This point is made in the documentary film Miss India Georgia (URBAN LIFE 
PRODUCTIONS 1997) about the competition for Miss India America in Georgia.  
 8. Mallika Rao, Why Miss America, Nina Davuluri, ‘Would Never Win Pageants In South Asia’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/miss-america-nina-
skin-color_n_3935348.html. 
 9. There may be significant disagreement about what constitutes skin tone difference, even 
within a racialized group. Skin tone measurement may be egocentric in that a dark-skinned member of 
a racialized group may judge the skin tone of another [group] member based on her own skin tone. 
Thus, a dark-skinned black person might rate another as lighter than the rating given by a light-skinned 
black person. Further, in-group notions of skin tone may differ from the perceptions of people outside 
this group. Taunya Lovell Banks, A Darker Shade of Pale Revisited: Disaggregated Blackness and 
Colorism in the “Post-Racial” Obama Era, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF 
A POST-RACIAL AMERICA 97 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2014) (citing Mark E. Hill, Race of the 
Interviewer and Perception of Skin Color: Evidence from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, 67 
AM.SOC. REV. 99, 100 (2002)).  
 10. The nine other non-white winners are: 1984 Vanessa Williams (first black winner) later 
replaced by runner-up Suzette Charles, also black; 1990 Debbye Turner Bell (black); 1991 Marjorie 
Vincent (black); 1994 Kimberly Aiken (black); 2001 Angela Perez Baraquio (First Asian winner); 
2003 Erika Harold (multi-racial); 2004 Ericka Dunlap (black); 2010 Caressa Cameron (black). One 
scholar on this subject noted that “Debbye Turner’s, dark, yet Anglo defined features and Marjorie 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/11
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Early discussions of colorism by legal scholars focus on how the 
practice impacts black Americans or other persons with some African 
ancestry.11 Yet the comments from South Asians about Davuluri’s skin 
tone sound surprisingly similar to conventional American notions of 
colorism practices. But in Miss Davuluri’s case, the comments seems 
counter intuitive. Instead of selecting a light-skinned woman, a cultural 
preference in the United States as well as India, a brown-skinned Asian 
Indian woman won. South Asian commentators explain Davuluri’s 
selection as a preference by the dominant American culture for darker 
more “exotic” South Asians. Thus skin tone preferences impacting South 
Asians operate within and outside of their communities. What is not clear 
is whether intra-group or inter-group skin tone preferences involving 
South Asians carry over to workplace decisions.  
This inquiry is important because South Asians comprise a significant 
portion of this country’s growing non-white population. There are more 
than three million South Asians in the United States.12 More specifically, 
ethnic Asian Indians represent the third-largest immigrant group by 
country of origin in the country today.13  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 and the older civil rights 
statute 42 U.S.C. § 198115 prohibit discrimination based on “color,” but 
neither statute defines the term.16 A little more than fifteen years ago I 
 
 
Vincent’s classic Black features were the subject of media attention.” Elwood Watson, Miss America’s 
Racial Milestones, DIVERSE ISSUES: HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 19, 2009), https://diverseeducation. 
wordpress.com/2009/01/14/miss-americas-racial-milestones/. As of 2009 there had been no Latina 
winner. Id. 
 11. See Leonard M. Baynes, If It’s Not Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a 
Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 
75 DENVER U. L. REV. 131, 146–53 (1997) (arguing about the existence of skin tone discrimination 
within the black American community); Leonard M. Baynes, Blinded by the Light: But Now I See, 20 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 491 (1998) (book review discussing the existence of intra-racial colorism 
among black Americans); Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1705 (2000) (arguing that colorism is a form of race-related discrimination); Trina Jones, Shades 
of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000) (arguing that colorism is a separate and 
distinct form of discrimination).  
 12. See ASIAN AMERICAN FEDERATION & STRENGTHENING SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITIES IN 
AMERICA, A DEMOGRAPHIC SNAPSHOT OF SOUTH ASIANS IN THE UNITED STATES (July 2012), 
available at http://saalt.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Demographic-Snapshot-Asian-American-
Foundation-2012.pdf (estimating the United States population of South Asians, defined as 
Bangladeshi, Bhutanese, Indian, Maldivian, Nepali, Pakistani, and Sri Lankan ethnicities at 3,441,773 
in 2010). 
 13. Monica Whatley & Jeanna Batalova, Indian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION 
INFO. SOURCE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1981).  
 15. Rev. Stat. § 1977, 18 Stat. 337 (1875) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 16. Kate Sablosky Elengold, in her examination of the legislative history of Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, argues that Congress often used the term “colored” interchangeably with “Negro” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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argued that skin tone discrimination, whether intra-racial or inter-racial, 
constitutes a form of race-based discrimination that tends to disadvantage 
individuals with dark skin tones.17 With few exceptions, more recent 
discussions of this topic among legal scholars continue to focus almost 
exclusively on black Americans.18 Thus, this Article asks whether 
colorism among or between racialized groups impacts immigrants from 
South Asia and their American-born offspring in the same way studies 
suggest that skin tone discrimination adversely impacts black Americans 
and Latinos in the workplace.19  
In exploring this question, I examined fifty-one employment 
discrimination cases involving South Asians decided between 1981 and 
2014. This Article also explores the difficulties South Asian plaintiffs face 
 
 
raising questions about whether the term “color” has a separate meaning. See Kate Sablosky Elengold, 
Branding Identity, 93 DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (arguing that the term “people of color” 
should not be considered the same as discrimination based on “color” under Title VII).(copy on file 
with the author) 
 17. Banks, supra note 11. 
 18. See Banks, supra note 9; Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and 
Identity Performance Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657 (2010) (explaining 
many of the practical impediments plaintiffs face when bringing intra-group claims); Taunya Lovell 
Banks, Multilayered Racism: Courts’ Continued Resistance to Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF 
DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS 213 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed., 2009) (discussing the 
empirical studies on skin tone bias and the implications and law’s inability to address the harms of 
colorism); Trina Jones, The Case for Legal Recognition of Colorism Claims, in SHADES OF 
DIFFERENCE, supra at 223 (arguing for legal recognition of colorism claims). But c.f., Tanya Kateri 
Hernandez, Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the “Diversity” Defense, 42 HARV. 
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 259 (2007) (looking at the implications of increased diversity, specifically among 
Latinos and the operation of employment discrimination law); Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Latinos at 
Work: When Color Discrimination Involves More Than Color, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra, at 
236 (arguing that judges misunderstand “the permutations of color discrimination” in cases involving 
Latinos).  
 For discussions of colorism among South Asians, see Cynthia E. Nance, Colorable Claims: The 
Continuing Significance of Color Under Title VII Forty Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 435 (2005) (arguing that colorism cases will account for an increasing number of Title VII 
cases); Shilpi Bhattacharya, The Desire for Whiteness: Can Law and Economics Explain It?, 2 
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 117 (2012) (arguing for a new theoretical perspective on colorism that focuses 
on economics rather than race); Trina Jones, The Significance of Skin Color in Asian and Asian-
American Communities: Initial Reflections, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1105 (2013) (discussing colorism 
among Asian Americans in general with reference to South Asians). 
 19. See Taunya Lovell Banks, A Darker Shade of Pale Revisited: Disaggregated Blackness and 
Colorism in the “Post-Racial” Obama Era, in COLOR MATTERS: SKIN TONE BIAS AND THE MYTH OF 
A POSTRACIAL AMERICA 95 (Kimberly Jade Norwood ed., 2013) (arguing that skin tone, rather than 
racial classification or racial self- identification, will, in the near future, determine who gets better 
access to quality education, jobs and real power in America); Banks, Multilayered Racism, supra note 
18, at 213 (arguing that the preference for lighter skin tones for all racialized groups may reflect 
unconscious or implicit biases); Hernandez, Latinos at Work, supra note 18, at 236; Hernandez, Latino 
Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination, supra note 18.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/11
  
 
 
 
 
2015] COLORISM AMONG SOUTH ASIANS 669 
 
 
 
 
when raising a Title VII color employment discrimination claim.20 South 
Asian plaintiffs are more likely to use Title VII rather than the older 
Section 1981 law because the latter does not cover discrimination based on 
national origin and claims filed by South Asians sometimes conflate race 
and national origin claims. 
The remaining article is divided into three sections. The first section 
briefly examines the influx of South Asians, specifically Asian Indians, in 
the United States since the mid-1960s. It also examines the colorism 
phenomena in India and the South Asian diaspora including the United 
States. The second section examines employment discrimination cases 
brought by South Asians, especially Asian Indians, and their invocation of 
skin tone in many of these cases. This section starts with a reexamination 
of Ali v. Bank of Pakistan, perhaps the earliest colorism case involving a 
South Asian.21 The 1981 federal district court opinion in Ali suggests that 
intra-group colorism claims involving South Asians are not cognizable 
under Title VII because they fall outside the “American experience.”22 
Thus, I examine the cases that follow Ali to determine whether and how 
South Asian plaintiffs invoke “color” in Title VII employment 
discrimination cases. The final section of this article contains some 
suggestions for both litigators and judges involved in workplace 
discrimination cases brought by South Asians.  
 
 
 20. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, that 42 
U.S.C. §1981 covers intentional discrimination based on ancestry or ethnicity, but not national origin. 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987). The lack of a clear distinction 
between ethnicity and national origin has resulted in a series of confusing lower court decisions. As 
noted in an ALR commentary summarizing cases on this issue: “The courts have found no adequate 
standard to distinguish racial from national origin discrimination, and have generally adopted a 
common–sense approach based upon the factual practicalities indicating a racial bias against certain 
groups of distinct national origin.” Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Applicability of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 
to National Origin Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 A.L.R. Fed. 103 (originally published in 
1979). Nevertheless, subsequent circuit courts of appeals that considered this issue generally conclude 
that Section 1981 does not cover discrimination based solely on national origin. See Torgerson v. City 
of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1053 (8th Cir. 2011); Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 756 
(7th Cir. 2006), as amended on denial of reh’g (May 25, 2006); El-Zabet v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 211 
F. App’x 460, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2006); Ingram v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 171 F. App’x 439, 441 (5th 
Cir. 2006); Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 850 (9th Cir. 
2004); Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2nd Cir. 1998); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 
1398, 1411 n.10 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 21. Ali v. Nat’l Bank of Pakistan, 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 22. Id. at 613. 
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II. ASIAN INDIANS IN AMERICA 
A. Growth in the Asian Indian Community  
Asian Indians comprise the largest group of South Asians in the United 
States. There are more than a million immigrants from India in the United 
States.23 Most Asian Indians entered the country after 1965 when 
immigration and naturalization restrictions on non-white immigrants eased 
with passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1965.24 Between 2000 and 2005 the ethnic Asian Indian population in the 
United States, immigrant and native born, rose to 2.3 million.25  
By 2011 there were nearly 1.9 million Asian Indian immigrants living 
in the United States, representing the third-largest immigrant group by 
country of origin.26 Asian Indian immigrants in 2011 were better educated, 
more likely to have strong English language skills and arrive on 
employment-based visas, and were less likely to live below the federal 
poverty line than the overall foreign-born population.27 The vast majority 
 
 
 23. There were two phases of Indian immigration—1899–1914 when 6,800 arrived in California 
(consisting of mostly peasants who took up farming). Prema Kurien, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics: 
Hindu and Muslim Indian Immigrants in the United States, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 263, 266 
(2001). But in 1917 the Asiatic Barred Zone Act banned immigration from most Asian countries 
including colonial India. Asiatic Barred Zone Act (Act of Feb. 5, 1917) ch. 29, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 
sec. 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876 (repealed 1952). Further, immigrants from these countries already in the 
United States could not naturalize. In re Thind, 268 F. 683 (D. Or. 1920). By the beginning of the 
twentieth century Hindus were underrepresented in the United States in relation to their proportion in 
India while Sikhs and Christians were particularly overrepresented . Kurien, supra, at 267; Sucheta 
Mazumdar, Racist Responses to Racism: The Aryan Myth and South Asians in the United States, 9 S. 
ASIA BULL. 47, 49 (1989). Interestingly, while upper-caste immigrants formed only twenty-five 
percent of the Indian population, in the United States most Indian Americans are from the upper caste 
(or claim to be). See VIJAY PRASHAD, UNCLE SWAMI: SOUTH ASIANS IN AMERICA TODAY 95 (2012). 
Although the ban on naturalization was lifted by the 1946 Luce–Celler Act, immigration quotas 
severely limited immigration from India. Mazumdar, supra, at 50. 
 24. The first wave of late twentieth century Indian immigrants were the highly educated, fluent 
English speakers who came under the special skills provision of the 1965 Immigration and 
Naturalization Act. These immigrants were welcomed due in part to a demand for English-speaking 
scientists, technicians, engineers, doctors, and other professionals. Kurien, Religion, Ethnicity, and 
Politics, supra note 23, at 266. Thus, the first wave of Asian Indian immigrants was quite prosperous, 
especially compared to the population of India, where only forty-eight percent are literate. Id. Many 
second wave of post-1965 immigrants were relatives of the first wave who entered under the family 
reunification provisions of the Act. Id. 
 25. Kurien, Who Speaks for Indian Americans?, supra note 4, at 762. 
 26. Monica Whatley & Jeanna Batalova, Indian Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION 
INFO. SOURCE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states.  
 27. Id. As a result of their numbers and relative affluence, Asian Indian Americans also have 
been able to develop the largest ethnic caucus on the Hill, the Congressional Caucus on India and 
Indian Americans. Kurien, supra note 4, at 762.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/11
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of children in Asian Indian immigrant families are born in the United 
States.28  
Given the growing number of ethnic Indians and other South Asians in 
the United States and the persistence of race-based workplace 
discrimination, it is likely that courts will see more claims brought by 
members of these communities. One issue is whether the courts fully 
understand the nuances of some claims by South Asians that have cultural 
roots and what litigants need to do to better inform the courts of their 
claims. Specifically, given the presence of skin tone bias within South 
Asian communities, one question is how courts will respond to these 
claims. The next section provides some background on colorism practices 
in India and within the larger South Asian diaspora.  
B. Colorism in India 
The origin of colorism practices in India and other parts of South Asia 
is contested.29 Colorism practices within the Asian Indian community are 
“not limited to one particularly [sic] faith, tradition or ethnicity.”30 Like 
other societies, there seems to be a gender component that 
disproportionately impacts Asian Indian women’s perceived 
marriageability.31 The popularity of skin lightening products for women in 
contemporary India (and elsewhere) reflects the connection between 
concepts of beauty and marriageability for women.
32
 On the surface this 
preference for marriageable Asian Indian women with light skin tones 
seems to mirror historical marriage patterns of women in the black 
American community.33 But it is unclear whether there is a racial 
component to Asian Indians’ preference for light-skinned women. 
Some studies of the light-skinned phenomena among Asian Indians 
suggest that there is no racial connection. These scholars argue that Asian 
women are not trying to become white racially rather they are trying to 
 
 
 28. Whatley & Batalova, supra note 26. 
 29. Colorism practices predate British colonization of India but were undoubtedly influenced by 
British colorphobia. Earlier theories, now largely discredited, link colorism practices to India’s caste 
system. See Shilpi Bhattacharya, The Desire for Whiteness: Can Law and Economics Explain It?, 2 
COLUM. J. RACE & L. 117, 124–25 (2012).  
 30. Murali Balaji, Not Caste in Color: Dispelling Myths in Our Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/murali-balaji/not-caste-in-color-dispel_b_4243013. 
html. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See MARGARET L. HUNTER, RACE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF SKIN TONE 249 (2005); 
Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Consuming Lightness, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 18, at 179. 
 33. Bhattacharya, supra note 29, at 119–21. 
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conform to their society’s notion of feminine beauty.34 Significantly, 
researchers also found that the preference for Asian women with light skin 
tones may be influenced by American Eurocentric notions of beauty when 
these Asians immigrate to the United States.35  
South Asians were not included in these studies of Asian women, but a 
few studies of South Asians made similar findings. For example, Roksana 
Badruddoja Rahman examined the role of skin tone in the New Jersey 
Hindu Indian immigrant community.36 She focused on Hindu Indian 
women’s concept of beauty and the significance of skin tone as a status 
marker in the marriage market.37  
Rahman argues that the politics and implications of skin color in 
Indian community and among black Americans are extraordinarily 
similar, and the strict juxtaposition of black and white works well in 
understanding the implications of skin color and the definition of 
beauty among black Americans, Indians in India, and Indians living 
in the U.S.38  
One commentator speculated that although Rahman’s subjects were 
“‘Hindu Indian women’ one can imagine that her findings are applicable 
to all women of Indian or South Asian origin.”39 This speculation seems 
confirmed by Sarita Sahay’s and Nivan Prian’s 1997 study of South Asian 
Canadian female university students.40 These authors found that, among 
this group, dark-skinned women and women who most differed from “the 
cultural White ideal”, most desired light skin.41 
 
 
 34. See Joanne L. Rondilla, Filipinos and the Color Complex, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra 
note 18, at 63. 
 35. Jones, The Significance of Skin Color, supra note 18, at 1118–19 (citing Rondilla, supra note 
18, at 67.). 
 36. Francis C. Assisi, Color Complex in the South Asian Diaspora, http://www.indolink.com/ 
displayArticleS.php?id=062204065913 (“Her hypothesis: that a larger proportion of lighter skinned 
women than darker skinned women feel beautiful and attractive.”). Id.. Rahman found that “feelings 
related to beauty and attractiveness and marriage marketability are partially determined by the 
lightness of their skin.” Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. In her study Rahman found “three major commonalties between [Asian] Indians and 
black Americans in general. First, both race and caste are systems of social closure. Second, black 
women in America and Indian women’s bodies are sexualized and racialized in a similar manner. And 
third, skin color and other facial features play a significant role.” Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Sarita Sahay & Nivan Prian, Skin-Color Preferences and Body Satisfaction Among South 
Asian-Canadian and European-Canadian Female University Students, 132 J. SOC. PSYCH. 161, 167 
(1997). 
 41. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/11
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More than a decade later, Zareena Grewal at the University of 
Michigan examined the “perspectives on interracial marriage and intra-
racial colour preferences” between first and second generation South 
Asian Muslims in Michigan to determine “the complex ways that 
constructions of identity are transformed in culturally fragmentary 
contexts such as the US.”42 She argues that “contemporary ideologies of 
colour in the post-colonial Muslim world are racial, although . . . 
categorically different from western racism.”43 She continues that “intra-
racism . . . corresponds to the rhetoric of white supremacy in suggestive 
ways. . . . [Thus] dismissing the fetishization of fair skin as . . . random or 
benign . . . neglects the power and continuing vitality of the rhetoric of 
white supremacy throughout the world.”44 
Some Asian Indian Americans caution that colorism among Asian 
Indians and the Indian diaspora is different from colorism as it has 
developed in the Americas. According to one commentator, “although 
colorism is a heavy thread in the Indian social fabric, it didn’t negate or 
automatically disenfranchise those who are dark. Nor does it automatically 
correlate to caste.”45 Others add that light skin tone preference may reflect 
sexism rather than racism within the South Asian community.46 But even 
these scholars concede that the increased popularity of skin lighteners 
among South Asian men reflects “racist biases from colonial times” and 
“persists among overseas Indians, especially those who have not 
integrated into the local culture or society.”47 Understandably, the lack of 
consensus about the nature and origin of colorism practices in South Asian 
communities may confound the courts trying to apply anti-discrimination 
law. 
Given the increased presence of South Asians in the United States, and 
the persistence of colorism practices within these communities, one 
question is whether intra-racial colorism claims are actionable under 
United States workplace anti-discrimination laws. This question was 
 
 
 42. Zareena Grewal, Marriage in Colour: Race, Religion and Spouse Selection in Four American 
Mosques, 32 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 323, 325 (2009). 
 43. Id. at 330. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Rachel Perls, Caste v. Colorism, HUE COLOR CONSULTING (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://hueconsulting.blogspot.com/2010/03/caste-vs-colorism.html. Many add that caste among 
Indians is not the same as race. Id.  
 46. Lavina Melwani, The White Complex, LITTLE INDIA (Aug. 17, 2007), http://www.littleindia. 
com/nri/1828-the-white-complex.html (citing University of Michigan School of Business Associate 
Professor Aneel Karnani). 
 47. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
674 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:665 
 
 
 
 
addressed by a federal district court in Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan,48 
one of the earliest colorism cases involving South Asians. This case, and 
subsequent employment discrimination cases brought by South Asians, 
will be discussed in the next section. 
III. THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. Ali v. National Bank of Pakistan 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Muhammad Ashraf Ali, self-
described as a “light-skinned Pakistan citizen[] from the Punjab 
province,”49 was employed by the National Bank of Pakistan in New 
York. In his employment discrimination suit against the bank, Ali claimed 
that his employer preferred, and treated more favorably, “dark-skinned 
Pakistan citizens from the province of Sind” in terms of promotion and 
pay.50 On its face, Ali’s claim seems to confirm the existence of intra-
racial colorism employment discrimination claims among South Asians 
who live and work in the United States. 
Unlike many colorism employment discrimination claims, which fail to 
survive motions to dismiss,51 the Ali case was tried before being dismissed 
by the judge in an oral opinion, but the appellate court remanded the 
case.52 At the second trial, Ali proceeded pro se, “submit[ing] his own 
proposed findings and conclusions.”53 There was testimony by supervisory 
officers from the bank, two of whom the court characterized as “darker 
than Ali” and three others characterized as “the same color as Ali or only 
marginally darker.”54  
Other than Ali’s testimony about skin tone differences between 
residents of Sind and Punjab, no other testimony or evidence was 
submitted to support his colorism claim.55 Unsurprisingly, the court, in 
 
 
 48. Ali, supra note 21, at 611.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Trina Jones, Intra-Group Preferencing: Proving Skin Color and Identity Performance 
Discrimination, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 657, 661–62 (2010). 
 52. Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 611. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court for 
reconsideration because the initial oral opinion “contained no citation of cases and failed to distinguish 
between fact and conclusions of law.” Thus, the appellate court was unable to determine whether the 
district court correctly applied the law. Id. 
 53. Id. at n.1. 
 54. Id. at 612. 
 55. Id. There was conflicting evidence of pay differentials based on skin tone and no evidence to 
support Ali’s claimed denial of promotion and no evidence to support that his demotion was based on 
skin tone bias. Id. 
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light of the evidence presented at the second trial, concluded that Ali had 
failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on color 
under Title VII. 56 More significantly for the purposes of this article, the 
court explained that even if Ali’s claim of intra-racial color-based 
discrimination were valid, the colorism practices complained of fell 
outside the realm of the “American experience.”57 Thus “there is no basis 
on [the] record for recognition.”58 The court added that even if Ali could 
establish skin tone discrimination, these claims are “usually mixed with or 
subordinated to claims of race discrimination.”59 Thus the court dismissed 
Ali’s claim for a second time.  
The court’s terminology in Ali, replete with nativism, is an extremely 
restrictive and static notion of race and race-related discrimination. The 
decision suggests two things: that color discrimination under Title VII, if 
recognized, is limited to the “American experience” and that color-based 
discrimination is the same as or subordinate to race discrimination claims. 
Both explanations are problematic.  
First, the meaning of the court’s “American experience” limitation is 
unclear. The American racial experience is grounded not so much in a 
black-white paradigm as in a white vs. non-white paradigm. In various 
places and times, race and race-related practices included others, notably 
Asian Indians immigrants, who were long-denied the ability to become 
naturalized citizens because the United Sates Supreme Court decided they 
were not “white” within the meaning of the naturalization law.60  
Second, the Ali court reads race discrimination very narrowly, equating 
skin tone discrimination with race discrimination and questioning whether 
a discrimination claim can lie between persons of the same “race”—intra-
racial colorism. In so doing, the court uncritically lumps all Pakistanis 
together when Ali was clearly claiming a difference—he was from the 
Punjab province where residents are light-skinned and his dark-skinned 
employers were from the Sind province where residents are dark-skinned. 
As one commentator points out, conflating color with race ignores the fact 
that discrimination based on color involves treating a person differently 
because of an immutable characteristic, in this case skin tone.61  
 
 
 56. Id. at 613. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. Cythnia Nance mentions this point to suggest that the court misunderstood or misapplied 
the proper standard. Nance, supra note 18, at 459.  
 59. Ali, 508 F. Supp. at 614 (citing Felix v. Marguez, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 31,279 
(D.D.C. 1980)). 
 60. In re Bhagat Singh Thind, 268 F. 683 (D. Or. 1920).  
 61. Nance, supra note 18, at 460–62. 
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Colorism is a race-like phenomenon based on a person’s immutable 
characteristic—skin tone— coupled with a belief that certain skin tones, 
usually light-skin, are preferable to dark-skin. South Asians have been 
present in this country in growing numbers for almost fifty years and there 
is evidence that colorism practices continue among many long-term 
residents and native-born South Asians.62 Thus it seems absurd to allow 
skin tone discrimination among South Asians to avoid the purview of anti-
discrimination laws when it seeps into the workplace.  
As notions of racial identity, whether imposed or adopted, become 
more fluid, courts must discard their parochial or outdated notions of what 
constitutes race or race-related discrimination. Even though the origins of 
colorism practices among South Asians remain contested, South Asian 
light-skinned preference, like the preference for light skin in the Americas, 
is grounded in the belief that light or “white” skin is better than non-white 
skin. Thus this belief, when it forms the basis for an adverse employment 
decision, should be actionable under Title VII. 
Only one scholar has examined the assumptions underlying the court’s 
exclusion in Ali of intra-racial colorism claims among South Asians, but 
she did not explore the subsequent impact of the Ali case on employment 
discrimination claims by South Asians.63 The next section looks at the 
post-Ali cases to see if they provide any answers or insights. 
B. Post-Ali Employment Discrimination Cases 
As mentioned previously, the vast majority of post-Ali Title VII cases 
with South Asian parties involve Asian Indians suing non-South Asians 
for workplace discrimination. A quick review of the pleadings is 
insightful. Most lawsuits are conventional race discrimination claims 
sometimes combined with national origin allegations and occasionally a 
religion claim—Hindu, Muslim or Sikh—suggesting that all of these 
factors may figure into a claimant’s perception of his identity or how he 
believes others see him. An alternative reading is that the claimants and 
their lawyers may not fully comprehend how to frame the discrimination 
claims in terms that American courts will understand. A closer 
 
 
 62. Jones, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV., supra note 18, at 1118 (noting that skin tone preference lessen 
in second and later generations). 
 63. Although Cynthia Nance discusses the Ali case in the context of her larger argument for legal 
recognition of intra-racial Title VII colorism claims, she does not discuss the impact of the Ali case. 
Nance, supra note 18, at 458–59.  
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examination of pleadings where a color claim is asserted illustrates this 
point. 
Only two of the approximately fifty cases can be characterized as intra-
racial and neither raises a color claim, but two of the inter-racial cases do. 
Both of the cases involve South Asians and black Americans and neither 
survived a motion to dismiss. In Nair v. Columbus State Community 
College, the plaintiff, an Asian Indian woman, sued alleging that her 
supervisor, a light skinned black woman, unlawfully discriminated against 
plaintiff on basis of race, color, and national origin, in violation of Title 
VII and state law.64 In the second case, Delon v. News & Observer Pub. 
Co., a light-skinned black American alleged employment discrimination 
on basis of race and national origin against her Asian Indian supervisor’s 
harassment, but the district court dismissed the case as untimely and 
insufficient.65 One wonders whether these cases were dismissed because 
the race and color claims were under-developed or whether, as their 
dismissal suggests, the claims were meritless. 
Occasionally, pleadings by South Asians allege discrimination based 
on color, usually more specifically described as “dark” or “dark brown.”66 
A few plaintiffs described their color as light-skinned or light brown.67 
Illustrating how skin tone, caste, religion and national origin are 
inextricably tied to South Asian identity, one Asian Indian plaintiff 
 
 
 64. Nair v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll., No. 2:02-CV-595, 2008 WL 483333 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 
19, 2008) Employer moved for summary judgment but the court denied the motion in part, finding that 
plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude supervisor’s 
proffered reasons were pretextual. Ultimately, the parties stipulated that the case be dismissed with 
prejudice. Nair v. Columbus State Comm, Docket No. 2:02-cv-00595 (S.D. Ohio Jun 14, 2002), Court 
Docket.  
 65. Delon v. News & Observer Pub. Co. of Raleigh, N. Carolina, No. 1:05CV259, 2007 WL 
5433774, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2007). 
 66. See, e.g., Braganza v. Donahoe, EEOC Decision No. 0520130133, 2013 WL 2903308 (June 
7, 2013) (Indian—dark brown); Riecker v. Donahoe, EEOC Decision No. 0120110392, 2012 WL 
5426968 (Oct. 24, 2012) (Pakistani—dark); Iyer v. Paulson, EEOC Decision, 0120073337, 2007 WL 
4209337 (Nov. 9, 2007) (Indian—dark complexion); Gupta v. Chao, EEOC Decision No. 
0120081351, 2008 WL 1744120 (Apr. 9, 2008) (Indian—dark complexion); Hans v. Potter, EEOC 
Decision No. 0120072547, 2007 WL 2077433 (July 16, 2007) (Indian—brown); George v. New York 
City Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 02 CIV. 1818 (AGS), 2003 WL 289617 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) 
(Indian—brown); Harichandran v. West, EEOC Decision No. 01975112, 1999 WL 767696 (Sept. 9, 
1999) (Sir Lankan—brown); Khosa v. Runyon, EEOC Decision No. 01961015, 1998 WL 37228 (Jan. 
14, 1998) (Indian—dark-skinned); Seetharaman v. Commonwealth Edison, No. 94 C 4373, 1995 WL 
453097 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 1995) aff’d sub nom. Seetharaman v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 79 F.3d 
1150 (7th Cir. 1996) (Indian—dark); Hamid v. Reich, EEOC Decision No. 01942292, 1995 WL 
112059 (Mar. 13, 1995) (Pakistani—dark).  
 67. Gulati v. Solis, EEOC Decision NO. 0120091332, 2009 WL 1173535 (Apr. 23, 2009) 
(Indian-light-skinned); Bhuller v. Frank, EEOC Decision No. 01894040, 1990 WL 1113456 (Mar. 23, 
1990) (Indian—light-brown); Rajpal v. Frank, EEOC Decision No. 01882181, 1988 WL 919614 (June 
29, 1988) (Indian—light brown). 
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described his “race” as “Aryan-Hindu” and his “color” as “light brown.”68 
This characterization of identity sounds similar to early twentieth century 
assertions by South Asian, primarily Asian Indian, petitioners for 
naturalization as they tried to get around the white-only restriction on 
naturalization.69  
In asserting color and religion, some South Asian plaintiffs are using 
physical and cultural markers to enhance their self-identified race claim. 
One commentator recently speculated that a Title VII color claim may be 
(mis)used by Asian Americans as an indicator of national or ancestral 
origin.70 More empirical evidence is needed to determine whether this is 
what is happening in these cases. The bottom line is that we simply do not 
know enough about the culture and how the American experience impacts 
South Asian cultures to draw any conclusions. 
As mentioned previously, two of the post-Ali Title VII cases involve 
intra-racial claims. In Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., a 
terminated “West Indian” employee consumer loan sales manager whose 
last name suggests South Asian ancestry, alleged race and age 
discrimination and wrongful discharge by a man whom the plaintiff 
identified as the same race as plaintiff.71 The plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant called him “a thief and a crook”, someone who “could never be 
trusted to do anything of benefit to the bank.”72 But the court in granting 
the employer’s motion for summary judgment noted, among other things, 
that because the parties were the same race “it is hard to fathom how [the 
defendant’s] statements could be construed to show” the plaintiff’s 
termination was racially biased.73  
Rajbahadoorsingh, however, should not be interpreted to mean that 
intra-racial Title VII discrimination claims are prohibited. In that case the 
alleged racial statements were not facially racial. Thus, one should read 
 
 
 68. Kalia v. Stone, EEOC Decision No. 05890463, 1989 WL 1007049 (Sept. 8, 1989). 
 69. See my discussion of this point in Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks 
and Asians in Mississippi Masala, Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 ASIAN L.J. 7, 18–22 (1998). 
 70. Jones, Significance of Skin Color, supra note 18, at 1119–20. 
 71. Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA., 168 F. Supp. 2d 496, 502 (D.V.I. 2001). 
 72. Id at 502–03.  
 73. The court ruled that (1) employers’ proffered reason for termination of sales manager 
because of conflicts of interest, relating to his side-business of selling and buying automobiles, was 
legitimate, non-race or age based reason for manager’s termination, and was not pretext, and 
(2) employers’ proffered reasons for termination of manager because of conflicts of interest, and 
disobedience of employers’ orders to stop buying and selling automobiles, were legitimate, statutorily 
approved reasons, under Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act (WDA), for manager’s termination, 
which were not pretextual. Id. 
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Rajbahadoorsingh only for the principle that claims of race-based 
discrimination must be very clearly alleged and proven. 
In Dhar v. NYC Departmentt of Transportation a self-identified former 
Bangladeshi Christian employee alleged that his Hindu Asian Indian 
supervisor from Gujurat illegally favored other Indian/Gujurati Hindu 
employees in violation of Title VII and New York state laws on the basis 
of race, religion and national origin.74 The issues, as spelled out in the 
complaint and supporting documents for the parties’ cross motions, are 
very complex. But the judge looking at the complaint is left wondering 
about the significance of the distinction between Bangladesh and Gujurat 
and whether religious differences also impact any skin tone distinctions. 
There was no mention that the documents filed in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss contained any documentation or reference to expert testimony 
explaining cultural practices or beliefs. Thus, the court is forced to decide 
the case solely relying on conventional American understanding of race. 
Unsurprisingly the court dismisses the claim. One also wonders whether 
the fact that the plaintiff proceeded pro se meant that his claims were not 
fully developed and this factor was a major cause of the case’s dismissal.  
The absence of an expert or cultural translator to explain South Asian 
attitudes and cultural behavior in intra-racial workplace discrimination 
claims involving South Asians leaves the courts in cases like Dhar and Ali 
in the dark. There is probably more going on in these cases than the 
pleadings disclose. Some cultural nuances are being missed by the 
American courts. But without the guidance of experts on the history and 
demographics of these communities, or without more specific pleading 
from the plaintiffs, courts cannot be expected to understand or judge the 
significance of the allegations.  
What is interesting about the post-Ali cases is that none directly assert a 
color claim like Ali’s. Perhaps the district court’s language about intra-
racial colorism cases falling outside the “American experience” 
discouraged plaintiffs from more squarely raising colorism claims. Yet the 
specific references to color in the employment discrimination complaints 
by South Asians suggests that, in their minds, their skin tone is a factor 
contributing to their adverse treatment in the workplace. The next section 
offers advice to litigators and judges about the treatment of colorism 
workplace discrimination claims involving South Asians. 
 
 
 74. Dhar v. NYC Dep’t of Transp., No. 10-CV-5681 ENV VVP, 2014 WL 4773965 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 24, 2014). Dhar also claimed that his other supervisor, a Bulgarian immigrant favored other 
Eastern European employees. Id. at *1. 
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IV. ADVICE TO LITIGANTS CONSIDERING TITLE VII COLORISM CLAIMS 
The Ali case illustrates that even if courts recognize colorism claims, 
successful claims will be rare and success is difficult to attain, especially 
for South Asians. The evidentiary deficiencies in the Ali case are fairly 
typical of colorism cases. These difficulties are complicated because 
courts are uneasy about drawing distinctions based on skin tone75 and are 
unfamiliar with colorism practices outside of the United States. Judging 
discriminatory practices, especially those grounded in other cultures, 
makes courts uneasy because they lack any expertise in or knowledge of 
these practices. Lacking guidance the court in Ali applies a notion of race 
and race-like discrimination grounded in the twentieth century black-white 
racial paradigm in the United States. This decision leaves litigants and 
judges wondering what to do when faced with these cases. 
The district court in Ali provided some clues. It said that assuming 
colorism claims by South Asians were actionable a plaintiff must establish 
“a pattern of discrimination by ancestral national origin, or by color or 
provincial residence as actual indicators” to prevail.76 This is exactly what 
happened in a fairly recent case. 
In Muhammad v. Islamic Society, a black woman convert to Islam sued 
the Islamic school at which she taught for race and gender discrimination 
under Title VII alleging, among other things, that she had been replaced in 
her job as principal by a “light-skinned woman” at the request of a director 
of the school, an Asian Indian man.77 At trial the plaintiff introduced 
expert testimony on a variety of “cultural” issues including skin tone bias 
in South Asian communities.78 The plaintiff prevailed at trial, and the 
Supreme Court of California, in an unpublished opinion, upheld the 
introduction of this testimony.79 Thus, one take-away from the success of 
the plaintiff in Muhammad, and the lack of success in other cases, is the 
importance of cultural evidence to help explain to the court the full nature 
of the complaint. In addition to expert testimony, judges also can use 
magistrates for more intensive fact-finding. These lessons are not limited 
to South Asian parties, but apply more broadly to a variety of other 
complaints involving cultural differences. 
 
 
 75. Banks, supra note 7, at 97. 
 76. Ali, supra note 21, at 614.  
 77. Muhammad v. Islamic Soc., No. G036534, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2693, *29 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2008). 
 78. Id. at *44-52.  
 79. Id. at *44-5 
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CONCLUSION 
American courts are not fully committed to recognizing colorism 
claims whether intra-racial or inter-racial. Their discomfort with these 
claims is exaggerated when the colorism practices complained of have 
their roots in cultures outside the United States. As this country grows 
more diverse, and as its non-white population becomes even more varied, 
courts must broaden their understanding of race and race-related 
discrimination that, though grounded in foreign countries, is alive and well 
in the United States. Litigants will have to lead the way in educating the 
courts.  
Title VII was intended to prohibit discrimination in the workplace 
based on race and color. Its goals are thwarted when claims of some 
workers go unaddressed because courts remain stuck in mid-twentieth 
century notions of what constitutes race discrimination. For fifty years 
Asian Indians and other South Asians have constituted a noticeable 
presence in the American workplace. It is important that courts try to 
better understand their claims of workplace discrimination.  
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